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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Two other courts recently presented with cases quite similar to
Gore ruled that the limitation-of-damages clause was against public
policy.47 These decisions did not go nearly as far as Gore, however,
because in each case the defendant was found to have been culpable in
some degree. In one instance the seed grower was actually negligent,48
and in the other, he fraudulently misrepresented the kind and quality
of the seeds.49 In contrast, the defendant in Gore was free of fault. The
result of the court's decision in Gore is that seed growers and retailers
are strictly liable for selling mislabeled products in North Carolina.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, now in force in this state, the
seller by labeling his seeds to be a specific variety has given an express
warranty of description 0 that may not be disclaimed by any inconsistent
terms in the sales contract.51 While the Code permits contractual limita-
tion of damages, the Gore opinion would forbid such a modification, at
least if the damages were limited to the return of purchase price. Thus,
under the Code, a seed seller may not disclaim his liability for breach
of an express warranty and under Gore he may not limit his damages.
ERNEST S. DELANEY, III
Securities Regulation-A Little Light and More Obfuscation on Rule
10b-5
For a decade or more there has been a prolific development of
federal case law involving private actions based on violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and of the implementing
41Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966); Dessert Seed Co.
v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970). In Dessert Seed the court
stated that the limitation-of-damages clause was "unreasonable, unconscionable, and against sound
public policy." Id. at 865, 454 S.W.2d at 311 (emphasis added).
48Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 865, 454 S.W.2d 307, 311
(1970).
"'Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, -, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, 618 (1966).
-UCC § 2-313(i)(b).
51See UCC § 2-316(1); UCC § 316, Comment 1; UCC § 2-313, Comments 1, 4.
'15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The portion of the statute relevant to this discussion reads as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means




Rule l0b-5.2 The result has been a broadly based federal anti-fraud law
which is tending to replace state remedies of common law fraud in
securities transactions.' As this new body of law developed, the United
States Supreme Court remained relatively silent on section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5.4 This silence has been broken with Superintendent of Insur-
ance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.5 Unfortunately, the nature of the
facts alleged in the complaint in Bankers Life and the questions of law
presented are outside the ambit of common corporate experience. Thus,
those who had hoped for much illumination of Rule 10b-5 when the
Court chose to review a case will probably be more disappointed than
enlightened.
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 directly affect the activities of most
corporations and their directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.
Decisions must be made on a recurrent basis with respect to transactions
in securities and in particular with respect to disclosure of information
on corporate activities. The holdings of the lower federal courts have
left varying degrees of uncertainty in the law governing such decisions.
What is the extent of the duty to disclose material information? What
information is material? Who is liable to be treated as an insider and
thus be required to surrender trading profits?6 And, finally, how are
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
217 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971):
It shall be unlawful...
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to [make a misleading
omission] . . . or
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3For sympathetic discussions of this trend see Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum:
The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Ruder, Current Develop-
ments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue under Rule lOb-5,
26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971).
'Rule lob-5 was construed in SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1968), but in the
Court's own language "[tihe questions presented [were] narrow ones." Id. at 465. The case was
not a private action, and the more significant question resolved was that the IvcCarran-Ferguson
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970), reserves to the states the regulation of insurance companies with
respect to their relations with policyholders but does not preempt federal regulation where securi-
ties transactions are concerned.
192 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
'The leading case which posed these questions and which is responsible for the proliferation
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remedies to be determined?7 Cases that pose these questions are not
infrequent, and the answers to these questions are of much concern to
corporate managers. Fortunately, it is the rare corporate manager who
must decide-like the defendants in Bankers Life-whether he will be
vulnerable under federal law if he siphons five million dollars of assets
from an insurance company. It is, then, an unhappy accident that the
principal case deals with such an unusual fact situation rather than the
recurrent problems exemplified by the classic case of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.'
In Bankers Life, the Superintendent of Insurance as plaintiff stood
in a role analogous to that of a trustee in bankruptcy of the defrauded
and insolvent Manhattan Casualty Company.' The complaint alleged
that certain of the defendants devised and executed a scheme whereby
they bought all of the common stock of Manhattan through the use of
its own assets to meet the purchase price. As a result, the company's
assets were depleted by five million dollars, it was apparently rendered
insolvent thereby, and creditors and policyholders were allegedly left
vulnerable.10 The fact that the complaint was evidently unclear and
incomplete" together with the circumstance that the case arose on a
motion to dismiss makes for some unfortunate speculation on the facts.
Despite this, it is at least relatively clear that there were three distinct
sets of transactions which made up the composite fraudulent scheme.,'
First, one of the individual defendants purchased all of the common
stock of Manhattan from Bankers Life and Casualty Co. with a five-
of Rule l0b-5 cases is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). In that case officers, directors, and management personnel of the company
who had knowledge of a significant mineral discovery were held to have violated Rule lOb-5 by
trading in the securities of the company in advance of public disclosure. In addition, the company
itself was found to have committed a violation by releasing an equivocal news item underplaying
the discovery.
7See Weiskopf, Remedies under Rule IOb-5, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 733 (1971).
'401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 n.l (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
1There is an issue of fact as to whether any person was indeed damaged by the defendants'
acts. The Supreme Court opinion alludes to damage to creditors. 92 S. Ct. at 169. The Securities
Exchange Commission speaks of damage to policyholders and creditors. Brief for SEC as Amicus
Curiae at 27. Contrariwise, the defendant Irving Trust Co. points out that the policyholders were
reinsured and that the Superintendent of Insurance is not asserting any creditor claims. Brief for
Respondent Irving Trust Co. at 23.
"300 F. Supp. at 1086 n.2. The confusion centers on two issues: was anyone actually damaged?
See note 10 supra. And was the board of directors in fact misled? See text accompanying note 25
infra.
12300 F. Supp. at 1087-92 provides a comprehensive treatment of the facts.
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million-dollar check drawn on the Irving Trust Co., there being no funds
on deposit with Irving to cover this check. Second, the new owner
caused the sale of Manhattan's portfolio of United States Treasury
obligations to cover this check. Third, there ensued an elaborate "shell
game" of purchasing and pledging certificates of deposit for the purpose
of showing Manhattan as payee for five million dollars to replace the
sold Treasury notes. In fact, the certificates were assigned to another
company controlled by the individual defendants and had no asset value
to Manhattan despite their appearance on the Manhattan balance sheet.
The district court characterized the case as one of common law
fraud under state law.13 The court of appeals affirmed. 4 The Supreme
Court, reversed, holding that a cause of action was stated under Rule
I Ob-5.15
The first and most obvious rule that can be extracted from Bankers
Life is that a private cause of action may be maintained on the basis of
a violation of Rule lOb-5.16 This conclusion is certainly anti-climactic
in that it was clearly foretold by the holding of the Supreme Court in
J. L Case Co. v. Borak17 (wherein a private cause of action was upheld
for violation of other sections of the Securities Exchange Act) and had
already formed the basis of decisions in substantially all of the courts
of appeals.'
It is also clear from Bankers Life that the Court will place a liberal
interpretation on the requirement that the Rule be confined to an "act
.. .in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."' 9 There
were three separate transactions in Bankers Life. The first was the sale
of the common stock of Manhattan by the defendant Bankers Life to
the defendant Begole. There were two obstacles to finding a violation
of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 solely on the basis of this transaction.
First, there was no allegation that the sale was for less than the full value
"Id. at 1102. In addition to a cause of action under state common law, it would appear that
the Superintendent of Insurance could attack the transaction by statute. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 536
(McKinney 1966).
"Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
"92 S. Ct. at 169-70.
WId. at 169 n.9.
17377 U.S. 426 (1964). Earlier still, the apparent progenitor of private action cases under Rule
lOb-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
"For a tally of cases and jurisdictions see 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871-73 (Supp.
1969) (hereinafter cited as Loss).
"See the text of Rule lOb-5 in note 2 supra. There had been little prior judicial interpretation
of the significance of the "in connection with" phrase. There is a limited discussion in 6 Loss 3616-
17.
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the stock. Second, Manhattan was not a party to the sale of its own
stock. To have allowed the plaintiff standing on the basis of this initial
transaction would have meant repudiation of the so-called "Birnbaum
rule"20 that the plaintiff must be either a buyer or a seller to bring the
action. As for the second transaction, Manhattan was a party to the sale
of its portfolio of Treasury bonds but it was not alleged that Manhattan
received less than full consideration for the bonds .2 There was no fraud
in connection with the sale of the bonds viewed as an independent trans-
action.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the actual fraud occurred
in the third transaction-when the certificate of deposit payable to
Manhattan was assigned without consideration and thus became value-
less as an asset of Manhattan. The fraud was consummated when the
proceeds of the prior transaction were thus diverted. Certificates of
deposit, however, are presumably not "securities" within the definition
of Rule lOb-5.2 2 Hence, the Rule would not have reached the fraudulent
act if the Court had interpreted "in connection with" as limited to the
immediate transaction which constituted the fraud. It was necessary to
treat the three separate transactions as one for the purpose of finding
an "act . . .in connection with the . . . sale of any security."
The second principle to be derived from Bankers Life would there-
fore seem to be that there is a violation of Rule 1Ob-5 such as to support
a cause of action when there is a sale of securities for full consideration,
followed by a fraudulent diversion of the proceeds, if the successive
transactions are planned and executed contemporaneously as part of
one integral fraudulent scheme. Such a broad interpretation of the "in
connection with" requirement presents two problems. From a policy
2'Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
It is possible that Bankers Life will be regarded by some as diluting the Birnbaum rule, but it should
be noted that the Court was careful to avoid doing so by interpreting the transaction so as to find
that the plaintiff was a "seller." The only allusion to the rule is in an ambiguous footnote. 92 S.
Ct. at 169 n.10.
2 The Treasury bonds were treated as within the definition of "securities" in 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). Cf. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (savings and loan
shares included).
zlThe district court declined to rule specifically on the question of whether certificates of
deposit are "securities" under Rule lOb-5, but the inference in the opinion is that they are not.
300 F. Supp. at 1099 & n.14a. In the definition of securities in the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970), an "evidence of indebtedness" was covered and would presumably include
certificates of deposit. The 1934 Act, however, excludes the phrase "evidence of indebtedness" and
further expressly excludes "any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity . . . not exceeding nine months." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). In the principal case,
the certificates had a six month maturity. 300 F. Supp. at 1100.
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perspective, it reinforces a trend toward a general federal common law
governing corporate fraud based on Rule 1Ob-5. It also poses the practi-
cal problem of how closely related the individual transactions need be
to fit into the Bankers Life pattern. Would the Court have found a cause
of action if the diversion of the proceeds had followed the sale of the
notes by one day? By one week? By one month? The opinion leaves these
questions unanswered.
Another question that had not been clarified by prior case law
under Rule 1Ob-5 was whether it was necessary that at least some of the
directors or shareholders of the corporation be deceived by the alleged
act or practice. Unfortunately, confusion of the facts in Bankers Life
deprives us of a clear answer to this question. This confusion centers on
the authorization of the sale of Manhattan's Treasury bonds. The Su-
preme Court seems to have assumed that the defendants induced the
directors of Manhattan to authorize the sale and in so doing misrepre-
sented or concealed the plan for diversion of the proceeds.2 3 The district
court assumed with much practical logic that the defendants installed
themselves or others who were presumably privy to the scheme as offi-
cers and directors immediately upon their acquisition of the Manhattan
common stock.2 4 The brief for the defendant Irving Trust Company so
states.25 If the latter view is correct, there was no deception or misrepre-
sentation. It is unlikely, however, that the outcome of the case would
have differed whatever view is closer to the facts. The Court had deter-
mined that the interests of the creditors and policyholders were to be
protected, and it was not likely to be deterred by the distinction as to
whether any of the directors had been deceived." It is thus probable that
an action may be brought by the "defrauded" corporation for the pur-
pose of protecting creditors even when the directors, the officers, and
the shareholder(s) of the corporation are the perpetrators of the fraud
or are privy to it. It is also apparent that it is not necessary that investors
be damaged by the deceptive act or practice. Thus, a third general rule
192 S. Ct. at 167 n.l.
21300 F. Supp. at 1089 n.6.
z'Brief for Respondent Irving Trust Co. at 5, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
2GThis conclusion is not totally clear from the principal case because of the apparent assump-
tion that some or all of the directors were deceived. Some case law supports the conclusion. See
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1964) (dictum); ef. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). But see O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
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may be drawn from the principal case: there is no longer any doubt that
the protection of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 extends beyond "the
integrity of the securities markets ' 2  to reach the corporate entity and
thereby its creditors.2
The Court in Bankers Life states that it finds support for this broad
view of the class of persons to be protected in the legislative history of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.2 1 Illustrative, perhaps, of
the dubious value of that legislative history is the fact that the court of
appeals reached the opposite conclusion, 3 while at least one eminent
authority finds the legislative history cursory and inconclusive.3'
There is a basic policy question as to the need for a general body
of federal law dealing with fraudulent breaches of the fiduciary duties
of directors, officers, and controlling shareholders of corporations.
32 If
the answer is "yes," there is a second question as to whether such a body
of law should be judge-made rather than the product of legislative codi-
fication. 33 It is certainly true that those who would answer "yes" to
both of these questions will be cheered by the holding of Bankers Life.
Two divergent lines of case law had developed under the Rule lOb-
5 umbrella. The first involved securities fraud in the pattern typified by
Texas Gulf Sulphur. The second involved general corporate mismanage-
ment through breaches of fiduciary duties. Conspicuous examples of the
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970).
z'See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961); Macey, Protection of Creditor's Rights Through Use of Rule lOb-5, 76 CoI.
L.J. 133 (1971); c.f. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
292 S. Ct. at 169 & n.8.
1430 F.2d at 361. The court of appeals followed the general interpretation set out in the
Birnbaum case.
3'6 Loss 3617 approves the Birnbaum version of the legislative history. For an entertaining
firsthand commentary on the cursory treatment given to Rule 10b-5 at the time of its adoption by
the Securities Exchange Commission see remarks of M. Freeman in Proceedings of ABA Section
of Corporation. Banking and Business Law, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967). For an appraisal which concludes that no sort of civil
remedy can be supported by the legislative history see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5:
Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
32See 6 Loss 3631-45, 3875. On the subject of the growth of Rule lOb-5, Professor Loss has
further said, "This is backdoor jurisprudence with a vengeance." Loss, History of SEC Legislative
Programs and Suggestions for a Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 795, 796 (1967). See, in addition, the articles
cited note 3 supra.
3See Proceedings of ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Conference
on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967); Painter, Rule lOb-5:
The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 699 (1971); Comment, Federal Corporation
Law and lOb-5: The Case for Codification, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 274 (1970).
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latter are Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.,4 where the defendant direc-
tors issued treasury stock to perpetuate their control; Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,35 in which a majority stockholder used its control to ac-
quire additional shares for inadequate consideration; and Hooper v.
Mountain States Securities Corp., 6 another instance of the issuance of
stock for inadequate consideration. Bankers Life can be seen as encour-
aging the use of Rule 1Ob-5 as it was used in these cases to allow
recovery for the breach of fiduciary obligations.
Nonetheless, Bankers Life is an atypical case and may be more
interesting for what it does not decide than for what it does. A valid
argument for a federal law governing corporate fraud is that the result
will be uniformity and simplified corporate decision-making. This argu-
ment for supplanting state law fails when the federal law develops
helter-skelter and lacks uniformity. A major role of the Supreme Court
is to help induce clarity and uniformity. Thus, if the Court decides to
encourage expansion of the role of the federal courts, it can be helpful
by accepting the concurrent responsibility of seeing that the expansion
is orderly and consistent. Bankers Life, dealing as it does with a peri-
pheral situation, may not prove to be very helpful in this respect.
In summary, Bankers Life foretells a broad interpretation of the
requirement in Rule lOb-5 that the questioned acts must be "in connec-
tion with" the purchase or sale of securities. The case also approves the
extension of the protection afforded by the Rule to creditors as well as
investors. On the other hand, the Court leaves the technical "Birnbaum
rule" undisturbed-the plaintiff must be a buyer or a seller.3 The
anomalous result is an endorsement of the letter of the Birnbaum case
but an implied rejection of the spirit of Birnbaum in that the basic
rationale for the Birnbaum rule was to confine the private cause of
action to the protection of the integrity of the securities markets.
As a result, Rule IOb-5 becomes a stronger weapon for the enforce-
ment of the general fiduciary duties of directors and controlling share-
holders, apart from its narrower function of regulating securities trans-
actions. Business lawyers and corporate managers, however, will have
to wait for definitive answers to the day-to-day questions of disclosure
obligations and remedies under Rule lOb-5.
ROBERT D. DARDEN, JR.
34339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
-1405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
-282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
"Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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